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Abstract 
 
 
Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement will lead to major job 
losses. More recently, these fears about job losses have extended to high skill labor and IT 
jobs. The paper examines with new firm level data whether these fears are justified for the 
two neighboring countries of Eastern Enlargement Austria and Germany. We find that Eastern 
Enlargement leads to surprising small job losses, because jobs in Eastern Europe do not com-
pete with jobs in Austria and Germany. Low cost jobs of affiliates in Eastern Europe help 
Austrian and German firms to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. 
However, we also find that multinational firms in Austria and Germany are outsourcing the 
most skill intensive activities to Eastern Europe taking advantage of cheap abundant skilled 
labor in Eastern Europe. We find that the firms’ outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are a 
response to a human capital scarcity in Austria and Germany which has become particularly 
severe in the 1990s. Corporations’ outsourcing of skill intensive firm activity to Eastern 
Europe has helped to ease the human capital crisis in both countries. We find that high skilled 
jobs transferred to Eastern Europe account for 10 percent of Germany’s and 48 percent of 
Austria’s supply of university graduates in the 1990s.  We then discuss what can be done to 
address the skill exodus to Eastern Europe. We show that R&D subsidies do not work in 
economies with a skill crisis and we suggest to liberalize the movement of high skill labor 
with Eastern Enlargement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement leads to major job losses 
in the member countries, in particular in Austria and Germany as the two most important 
neighbors of Eastern Enlargement. More recently, in Germany these fears about job losses to 
the accession countries have extended to high skill labor and IT jobs. German firms are seen 
to outsource the skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe leading to an exodus of 
firms and high skill jobs to Eastern Europe. Are these fears justified? 
 
To address these questions the paper makes use of new survey data of 660 German and Aus-
trian firms with 2200 investment projects in transition countries during the period 1990 to 
2001. The new survey data represent 100 percent of Austrian and 80 percent of German direct 
investment in Eastern Europe. 
 
The paper is discussing three issues. First, I examine whether Eastern Europe has become a 
new member in the new international division of labor which has characterized the world 
economy in the last two decades. Is Eastern Europe becoming an important location for firms’ 
international organization of production? (section 3) Then I examine whether an exodus of 
jobs to Eastern Europe has, in fact, taken place. Has Eastern Enlargement encouraged the re-
location of firms to Eastern Europe substituting cheap Eastern workers for costly German or 
Austrian workers? (section 4) Third, I look at whether it is indeed the case that the high skill 
jobs are moving to the East as is repeatedly argued in the public press in Germany (section 5). 
Lastly I discuss some of the proposals made to address the problem of firms’ outsourcing of 
high skilled labor. In particular I show that subsidizing R&D activity in Germany or Austria 
to prevent the skill exodus to Eastern Europe will exacerbate the problem. I then suggest to 
immediately liberalize the movement of skilled workers with Eastern Enlargement to address 
the human capital crisis in Germany and Austria.    
 
 
 
 
2. Trade and Investment Integration with Eastern Europe 
 
 
Since the fall of communism trade integration with Eastern Europe has taken place on a fast 
pace in both countries.  In 2001 11 percent of Germany’s and 17 percent of Austria’s exports 
are going to Eastern Europe and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and 13 per-
cent of both countries imports are coming from this region. The trade shares with Eastern 
Europe have been in the range of 7 to 10 percent immediately after the fall of the iron curtain 
in 1990  in both countries (see Table 1). As a result Eastern Europe accounts now with 4.7 
percent and 3.3 percent of GDP for more than 2/3 of all low wage imports in Austria and 
Germany, respectively (see Table 2). 
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During the 1990s investment integration with Eastern Europe has been much more pro-
nounced than trade integration, in particular in Austria. In 2001 Eastern Europe accounts for 
88 percent of total outgoing investment in Austria, while the share of Eastern Europe in Ger-
many’s foreign investment is 4 percent only.  Thus, with the opening up of Eastern Europe 
Austria has concentrated almost all its outgoing investment to this region, while on a global 
scale Eastern Europe is of little importance as a host region for Germany (see Table 3). Nev-
ertheless, Germany and Austria are the most important investors in this region. Both countries 
account for around 50 percent of total incoming foreign investment in Croatia and Slovenia   
(see columns incoming FDI in Table 3) and for around 40 percent of total incoming invest-
ment in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic. German investment moves 
predominantly to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Russia, while Austria’s invest-
ment goes to Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Croatia. Since the mid 
1990s there has been a relocation of foreign investment from the accession countries to the 
candidate countries of the second round (in particular to Croatia) and to the CIS in particular 
in Germany. 
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3. The Data 
 
 
The firm survey among German and Austrian investors in Eastern Europe has been conducted 
in the years 1997-2001 in Germany and 1999-2001 in Austria. The sample consists of 2200 
investment projects by 660 Austrian and German firms during the period 1990 to 2001. In 
terms of value the 1200 German investment projects represent 80 percent of total German 
investment in Eastern Europe, while the 1000 Austrian investment projects represent 100 per-
cent of total Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. The data cover the period of 1990-2001, 
but the actual numbers are from the years 1997-2000 in Germany and 1999-200 in Austria.  
 
Under communism practically no foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe have taken 
place due to a political ownership constraint.  Thus, when we started the firm survey among 
German and Austrian firms with investments in Eastern Europe, we were in the unique situa-
tion to go for detailed information on each foreign investment project in Eastern Europe and 
at the same time to aim for a full population sample. The result is a data set that allows us to 
say something representative about how foreign direct investment and outsourcing to Eastern 
Europe affect the Austrian and German economy. At the same time,  the data also allow us to 
say something representative of how incoming foreign investment is affecting Eastern 
Europe, because Austria and Germany are such important investors in this region (the two 
countries account for 40 to 50 percent of all incoming investment in many countries of East-
ern Europe, see Table 3). 
 
The questionnaire of the survey comes in three parts: information on parent firms in Austria 
and Germany, information on the actual investment project, and information on Eastern Euro-
pean affiliates and their environment. A parent firm may undertake more than one investment 
in Eastern Europe. In the sample the Austrian investor has undertaken 4 to 5 investments and 
the German investor 2 to 3 investments in Eastern Europe on average. Due to the length of the 
questionnaire (we collected information on about 500 variables) we personally visited the 
parent firms in Austria and Germany, respectively or conducted the interview by phone. Very 
few questionnaires have been sent out by mail and have been filled out anonymously. The 
sample is unique in several dimensions. First, it includes detailed information on parent firms 
in Austria and Germany, like balance sheet data, the internal organization of the multinational 
enterprise, its global network, the incentive system used for its workers, power relations be-
tween parent and affiliates etc. Second, it contains information about how and where the in-
vestment is financed. Third, it includes information on affiliates in Eastern Europe like own-
ership structure, type of ownership, financial structure, competitive environment, parent and 
affiliate trade relations etc. The sample consists of quantitative as well as qualitative informa-
tion.  
 
 
4. A New Member in the Global Division of Labor?  
 
 
Is Eastern Enlargement offering Eastern Europe the prospect of becoming a new member in 
the new international division of labor? If yes, what kind of firm activity is transferred to 
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Eastern Europe? In the last two decades the world economy has gone through a dramatic 
change. A new international division of labor is emerging in the world economy.  The global 
firm produces one input in one location which is then send for refinement to a second loca-
tion. The refined input then gets further refinement in a third location. Thus, firms geographi-
cally separate different production stages across the world economy to exploit differences in 
production costs.2 Take the example of the German firm Siemens. As other global corpora-
tions, Siemens has organized its activities in a global value chain with its R&D and engineer-
ing activity located in Europe and the US, procurement and logistics located in South East 
Asia, its assembly activity located in Eastern Europe, and its marketing activity organized on 
the local market or via the internet.3 Is this organizational pattern a more general trend among 
firms in Austria and Germany, respectively and is Eastern Europe becoming an important 
location for these firms in their global organization of production?  
 
In other words, why do German and Austrian firms invest in Eastern Europe (EE)? Do they 
want to replicate their production facilities in the countries in EE or do they want to exploit 
differences in factor costs between Germany and Austria on the one hand and EE on the 
other? The former is a horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) and is primarily motivated 
to gain access to the host country market. The latter is a vertical FDI and is motivated by 
wage differentials.4 One reason why we might be interested to distinguish between these two 
forms of multinational activity is to identify their potential effects on wage inequality and 
employment levels in Austria and Germany.  
 
If an outward investment to Eastern Europe is just an expression of German or Austrian firms 
taking control over assets in Eastern Europe without a cross-border shift in production capac-
ity, then foreign investments in Eastern Europe will have little effect on wages and employ-
ment levels in Germany or Austria. If an outward investment actually involves a shift in pro-
duction capacity, then the issue is whether the outgoing investment is vertical or horizontal in 
nature. In a vertical FDI European firms outsource the labor intensive part of their production 
to a low wage country in Eastern Europe and cut this production stage in the skill labor abun-
dant European Union. Thus, a vertical foreign investment leads to an increase in the wage of 
skilled relative to unskilled labor or to an increase in unemployment of unskilled labor in the 
European Union when wages are not allowed to adjust. In a horizontal FDI the European 
firms produce the same products in their affiliates in Eastern Europe. Horizontal FDI is driven 
by market access considerations, while vertical FDI is motivated by differences in factor 
prices between the European Union and the countries in Eastern Europe. Thus, FDI is more 
likely to generate wage inequality or unemployment in the European Union when it is vertical 
in nature.  
 
                                                          
2 The new features of globalization are described in the Globalization Report to the European Commission, see  
Bourguignon et al 2002. 
3 See Financial Times Deutschland , 12. December 2003, and Sorg, Armin, Erwartungen und Erfahrungen eines 
Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen einer EU-Osterweiterung, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn  2001. 
4 For the theory of vertical FDI, see Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985), for theories of horizontal 
FDI, see Brainard (1993, 1997), Markusen and Venables (2000). 
 
 
 8
1)
2)
3)
 country: average wage (wage bill per employee) in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
 country: GDP per employment in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
   firm: sales per employee of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000, and for Germany in 1997-2000
 country: wage bill divided by GDP in Eastern Europe relative to Germany and Austria, respectively, in 2001
   firm: wage bill divided by sales of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively;  for Austria in 1999-2000; for Germany in 
            1997-2000
Source: The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw); Statistisches Bundesamt; Statistik Austria; Chair of In ternational Economics, University of Munich, firm 
survey of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 660 firms
   firm: average wage (wage bill per employee) of affiliates in Eastern Europe relative to parent firms in Germany and Austria, respectively; for Austria in 1999-2000 and for   
           Germany in 1997-2000
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When multinational firms wish to exploit differences in factor costs in Eastern Europe how 
much in terms of labor costs can they save when establishing an affiliate in Eastern Europe? 
In Figure 1 we compare relative wages, relative productivity, and relative unit labor costs be-
tween Austria and Germany on the one hand and the accession countries (CEE), the candidate 
countries of the second round (SEE), and the countries of the former Soviet Union (CIS) on 
the other. We focus first on Germany. It appears from the left panel of Figure 1 that wages in 
the accession countries are about 23 percent of those in Germany, while these countries’ pro-
ductivity has reached about 23 percent of Germany’s productivity level. As a result, labor unit 
costs in the accession countries are the same as in Germany. Thus, when German firms buy 
input goods in one of the accession countries they do not save on costs for the input good 
compared to when the input is produced in Germany.  
 
Can these costs be reduced when multinational firms open an affiliate in one of the accession 
countries and produce the input themselves?  Figure 1 reveals that German affiliates in the 
accession countries pay 17 percent of their German parent wages but are increasing their pro-
ductivity to 60 percent of the parents’ productivity level.  Therefore, they can reduce the labor 
costs by 72 percent relative to their parent firms’ cost in Germany.  
 
In the SEE countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) both wages and productivity are low so 
that unit labor costs in the SEE countries are 91 percent of Germany’s unit labor costs. Fur-
thermore, these costs are not reduced by as much as in the CEE countries when German firms 
produce locally in the SEE countries (labor cost are reduced by 50 percent), since producing 
locally does not help to increase productivity as much as in the CEE countries.    
 
The picture looks different in the CIS countries. Relative wages in Russia and Ukraine are 5 
percent of Germany’s, while these countries have 8 percent of Germany’s productivity, so that 
their unit labor costs are 67 percent of Germany’s. However, when German firms produce 
locally in affiliates in the CIS they can save 73 percent of their labor costs due to lower wages 
of German affiliates in Russia and Ukraine.  
 
From these numbers it appears that the accession countries are a particular attractive location 
for German investors due to the relatively high productivity levels of their affiliates in these 
countries. The CIS are also attractive locations due to their low relative wages in particular in 
German affiliates in these countries. The SEE countries, however, do not appear to bring as 
much in terms of labor cost savings.  
 
 
The right panel of Figure 1 gives the same data for Austria. At the country level Austria’s 
comparative advantage with Eastern Europe looks very similar to that of Germany. The num-
bers suggest that relative to Austria the CIS countries have the lowest labor unit costs fol-
lowed by the SEE, while the CEE countries have already stopped to have lower production 
costs than Austria. However, the ranking of regions is reversed at the firm level. When Aus-
trian multinationals produce locally, they can save 51 percent of their labor costs in their ac-
cession countries’ affiliates, 42 percent in their SEE’ affiliates, and only 37 percent of the 
costs in their CIS’ affiliates.  
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But how important are each of these motivations – market seeking versus cost advantage 
seeking – for foreign direct investments in Eastern Europe? Are German and Austrian firms 
primarily moving their activities to Eastern Europe to exploit differences in factor prices or do 
they want to be close to the Eastern European market by producing locally?  
 
 
One way to answer this question is to look at the pattern of intra-firm trade. In Table 4 I use 
the pattern of intra-firm trade as a criterion whether German and Austrian foreign investments 
in Eastern Europe, respectively are market seeking or cost advantage seeking. I define a for-
eign investment in Eastern Europe as a multinational outsourcing activity driven to exploit 
differences in factor prices when parent firms in Austria and Germany, respectively export 
input goods to their affiliates in Eastern Europe as well as import these goods back from their 
affiliates in Eastern Europe after refinement. Thus, in an outsourcing activity affiliates in 
Eastern Europe do not produce exclusively for the local market. This way, multinational out-
sourcing involves an intra-firm export from the parent firm in Germany or Austria to their 
affiliates in Eastern Europe as well as an intra-firm import from their affiliates in Eastern 
Europe to Germany or Austria. 5 
 
I focus first on Germany. From the right panel of Table 4 we see that on average 45 percent of 
all German investment to Eastern Europe fulfill these criteria and are outsourcing activities of 
German firms motivated by lower wages in Eastern Europe.  The importance of outsourcing 
investment becomes, however, much larger for individual Eastern European countries. Out-
sourcing dominates among German investment in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
and Romania (share of around 70 percent). It plays little role in Slovenia and Poland. When a  
tighter criterion for outsourcing is used requiring that parent firms import at least 20 percent 
of their Eastern European affiliates’ output rather than import at all, German multinationals 
outsourcing is reduced to 10 percent in the Czech Republic, to 7 percent in Russia and to 2 
percent in Ukraine. All the other numbers remain the same.  
 
 
Among Austrian multinationals the outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are much less 
important. Only 17 percent of total Austrian investment to Eastern Europe is motivated by 
lower wages in Eastern Europe. But again the share varies considerably across individual 
countries in Eastern Europe. 68 percent of Austria’s investment in Russia and 42 percent of its 
investment in Poland are motivated by factor prices. These numbers are not changed when the 
stricter criterion for outsourcing is applied requiring parent firms to import at least 20 percent 
of their Eastern European affiliates’ output.  
 
                                                          
5 In the literature different definitions of  outsourcing have been used. Hummels et al (2001) use input-output 
tables at the industry level to calculate an index of vertical specialization. Vertical specialization is defined as the 
share of imported inputs which is reexported. Hanson et al (2001) use the notion of export platforms to calculate 
the share of exports in percent of affiliates’ output of US multinationals.  The criterion for outsourcing used here 
is somewhat more strict than those in the literature. It is more strict than Hummels et al’s measure of vertical 
specialization, since I include intra-firm inputs only, while Hummels et al include inputs also between independ-
ent firms. It is also more strict than Hanson et al’s concept of export platforms, since I require an import as well 
as an export between parent and affiliates and I include exports of  affiliates to parent firms only, while Hanson 
et all include all exports of affiliates whatever their destination in their measure of export platforms. 
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Next, we examine the pattern of multinational investment and outsourcing across sectors (Ta-
ble 5). German investment is predominantly engaged in manufacturing activity in Eastern 
Europe (almost 60 percent of total investment), of which manufactured goods and machinery 
and transport are the most important sectors. Austrian investment is predominantly involved 
in services (more than 70 percent of total investment) in particular in banking and financial 
intermediation. This can be illustrated by the importance of one single multinational firm in 
each of these countries. Both Siemens, a manufacturing firm, and Bank Austria, a bank, each 
account for about 10 percent of Germany‘s and Austria’s investment in Eastern Europe, re-
spectively.  Table 5 reports also the importance of outsourcing for individual sectors. It ap-
pears from the table that 90 percent of German investment in machinery and transport are 
outsourcing investments. Outsourcing plays also an important role in manufactured goods for 
both German as well as Austrian investment. More surprisingly however, outsourcing is not 
confined to manufacturing and has become a dominant phenomenon in services as well such 
as logistic services (transport, storage and communication) with 79 percent of outsourcing 
investment in Germany and 27 percent in Austria. Note also, that with 30 percent of invest-
ment, outsourcing has become prevalent in the banking and financial sector in Austria as 
well.6 
 
Finally, we ask how important are firms’ outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe for Ger-
many’s and Austria’s international trade, respectively with these countries? In other words, 
what is the share of intra-firm trade - trade which takes place inside the multinational enter-
prise between parent firms and their affiliates in Eastern Europe - in foreign trade between 
Germany and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Austria and Eastern Europe on the other? 
The answer to this question is given in Table 6. I focus first on Germany. Although firms’ 
outsourcing activity is a dominant feature of German investment in Eastern Europe, it is not 
very important for its trade with Eastern Europe. Only 12 percent of Germany’s exports to 
Eastern Europe are intra-firm exports and 22 percent of its imports from Eastern Europe are 
intra-firm imports.  But again there is considerable variation across individual countries. For 
example, Germany’s trade with the Slovak Republic is dominated by intra-firm trade. 65 per-
cent of Germany’s imports from Slovakia and 34 percent of its exports to Slovakia are trade 
within the multinational enterprise between German parent firms and their affiliates in Slova-
kia.  
 
In contrast, Austria’s international trade with Eastern Europe is dominated by intra-firm trade, 
in spite of the fact that outsourcing is not an important motivation for Austria’s investment in 
Eastern Europe. Almost 70 percent of Austria’s imports from Eastern Europe are goods from 
Austria’s affiliates in Eastern Europe to their parent firms in Austria. 22 percent of Austria’s 
exports to Eastern Europe is trade within the multinational enterprise. The intra-firm trade 
ratios vary considerably across countries. For example, Hungary’s intra-firm exports to Aus-
tria are exceeding those of the official trade statistics, while trade with Bulgaria is mainly 
trade outside the multinational corporation between two independent firms.  It is interesting to 
note, that Austria’s trade with Russia has a significant share of intra-firm trade.  This is not 
surprising since outsourcing dominates among Austria’s FDI in Russia.  
                                                          
6 See also The Economist December 2003 who points to the recent importance of outsourcing activities in IT and 
other services. 
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In sum, the pattern of vertical specialization that has emerged between Germany and Eastern 
Europe on the one hand and Austria and Eastern Europe on the other, suggests that some of 
the Eastern European countries like Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Romania, and 
Russia have clearly become new members in the international division of labor. 
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5. An Exodus of Jobs? 
 
 
In the previous section we have documented that German and Austrian firms can save a sub-
stantial amount of labor costs (between 37 to 73 percent) by outsourcing activities to Eastern 
Europe. We also showed that in Germany 45 percent and in Austria 17 percent of investments 
in Eastern Europe are motivated by lower wages in Eastern Europe in which these firms out-
source labor intensive production stages to Eastern Europe. Does this imply that these out-
sourcing activities have caused major job losses in Germany and Austria, respectively? We 
first look at what firms themselves say they are doing and then turn to an econometric analy-
sis. 
 
 
5.1 What the Firms say 
 
In this section we give a back on the envelope calculation of multinational job relocations to 
Eastern Europe based on what multinational corporations say they are doing. In the firm sur-
vey we ask firms to classify what motivated their investment to Eastern Europe and whether 
or not the investment is a relocation of production to Eastern Europe or created additional 
capacity in Eastern Europe beyond the production in Austria and Germany, respectively. The 
motivations considered are access to the Eastern European market, market size, lower produc-
tion costs, availability of well trained skilled labor, avoidance of transport costs and of ex-
change rate risk etc. In addition firms gave us information on how many jobs each of their 
investment created in Eastern Europe. A positive response to lower production costs and to 
offshore production in the survey together with the filled in information on jobs in Eastern 
Europe is then used to compute the job losses associated with offshore production in Austria 
and Germany, respectively. 
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The calculation is given in Table 7. German multinationals have created 463.550 jobs and 
Austrian multinationals 201.795 jobs in Eastern Europe. According to our calculation these 
newly created jobs in Eastern Europe have led to a direct loss of 90.000 jobs in Germany and 
22.000 jobs in Austria due to multinational relocations to Eastern Europe. These figures are 
obtained by computing the jobs created by German firms in Eastern Europe when investors 
have given low costs or outsourcing as the prime motivation for the investment. Out of this 
motivation German firms have created 232,772 jobs in Eastern Europe, which accounts for 50 
percent of total German affiliates’ employment in Eastern Europe. Note however, that Ger-
man affiliates in Eastern Europe have on average 39 percent of the productivity level of their 
parent firms only. Therefore, one job created in Eastern Europe is equivalent to a 0.39 job lost 
in Germany implying a relocation induced job destruction of 91.158 jobs in Germany.  
 
But the opening of a subsidiary in Eastern Europe creates new trading opportunities. German 
parent firms typically deliver inputs for further refinement to their affiliates in Eastern 
Europe. These intra firm exports to EE create 36.606 jobs in Germany. The number is ob-
tained by computing the number of jobs created in Austria and Germany, respectively due to 
inputs delivered by parent firms to affiliates in Eastern Europe. To compute the number of 
jobs created in Germany we divide the value of inputs send to affiliates in Eastern Europe by 
the parents’ value added per worker. Thus, 36.606 workers in Germany were used to produce 
the value of inputs send to Eastern European affiliates. 
 
Eastern European affiliates, in turn, deliver the refined inputs or final goods back to parent 
companies. These intra firm imports from EE destroy 34.555 jobs in Germany. Again this 
number is obtained by computing the number of jobs destroyed in Germany due to EE affili-
ates’ delivery of goods to parent firms in Germany. The value added of Eastern European 
affiliates is divided by parent firms’ value added per worker. Thus, 34.555 workers are not 
used in German production, because the value added is produced by Eastern European affili-
ates. The described intra-firm exports and imports lead to a net trade induced job creation of 
2.051 jobs. This adds up to a net destruction of 89.106 jobs in Germany.  
 
An analogous computation results in a net destruction of 21.964 jobs in Austria. It is interest-
ing to note that Austrian firms create 48.516 jobs in Eastern Europe out of a cost saving moti-
vation, which accounts for 24 percent of total Austrian affiliates employment in Eastern 
Europe. This is half as much as in Germany where 50 percent of affiliates’ jobs in Eastern 
Europe are created out of cost considerations.7 Taking the productivity differential between 
parent and affiliates and intra firm trade into account the job creation in Eastern Europe trans-
lates into a destruction of  21.964 jobs in Austria. 
 
The computation in Table 7 is a rough calculation and has to be taken for what it is. Thus, the 
computed job numbers have to be interpreted with caution. In particular, the calculation has 
                                                          
7 This is consistent with the findings of the previous section that outsourcing activities dominate among German 
investment, but not among Austrian investment in Eastern Europe. One reason for this difference between Ger-
many and Austria is the different pattern of specialization of German and Austrian investment in Eastern Europe 
reported in Table 5. Germany is predominantly engaged in machinery and transport with 90 percent of outsourc-
ing investment, while Austria is predominantly involved in banking with 30 percent of outsourcing investment. 
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the following shortcomings. As the calculation is based on firms’ perspectives, it assumes that 
one job lost at the level of the firm translates into one job lost to the economy as a whole. 
Thus, the computation ignores any general equilibrium effects. Typically, when workers loose 
their jobs at one particular firm, they are reemployed at some other firms with an accompa-
nied adjustment in wages.  Ignoring such general equilibrium effects may be justified when 
wages are not allowed to adjust due to labor market rigidities. Figure 2 of section 5 indeed 
shows that relative wages remained more or less fixed in both countries during the 1990s sug-
gesting that these general equilibrium effects could not fully work themselves through the 
system. Thus, applying the 1 to 1 assumption does not seem to be completely unrealistic for 
Austria and Germany.   In any case, the computation results in stronger job losses in Germany 
and Austria, respectively than would have taken place otherwise with flexible wages when 
general equilibrium effects are taken into account and thus can be seen to represent an upper 
bound of the true job losses due to outsourcing.    
 
The computed losses of 89.106 jobs in Germany and of 21.964 jobs in Austria account for 
about 0.3 percent and 0.7 percent of total employment in Germany and Austria, respectively. 
These are indeed small numbers.   
 
Why are these job losses so surprisingly low? To get to an answer we turn now to an econo-
metric analysis of multinational’s labor demand.  
 
 
5.2 An Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section I examine whether and how multinationals’ labor demand across locations is 
related by estimating labor demand functions of German and Austrian parent firms. Does the 
multinational firm in Austria and Germany, respectively reduce labor demand in the Austrian 
and German labor market when wages in their affiliates in Eastern Europe decline? In this 
case cheaper labor in Eastern Europe substitutes for expensive labor in Austria and Germany. 
 
Consider a firm producing in a number of countries. The firm that can decompose production 
across borders maximizes global profits. Global profits is the sum of revenues across loca-
tions of production minus production costs. The firm chooses a vertical decomposition of 
production to optimize over relative wages leading to complementarity in labor demands be-
tween locations. Thus, the location of production stages depends on relative wages if trade 
barriers are not prohibitive. Assembly is produced in the low wage location if there is intra-
firm trade. In a simple two country case, the parent’s labor demand iL  can be expressed as  
 
 
(1)                                              jjiijjiiii YYwwL γγββα ++++=                     
 
 
The multinational’s reduced form labor demand for a given affiliate location j  is the weighted 
sum of labor costs w and  demand conditions Y across locations.8 The focus of our empirical 
                                                          
8 For the model, see Riker and Brainard (1997). 
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analysis is to estimate the cross-elasticity of labor demand jβ . If production is vertically de-
composed then the parent’s labor demand will be decreasing in the wage in its location, 
0<iβ , decreasing in the wage of its affiliate location 0<jβ , increasing in local de-
mand 0>jγ , and  increasing in foreign demand 0>jγ . On the other hand, if production is 
not vertically decomposed, then 0≥jβ . With 0<jβ , multinationals are linked internation-
ally at the firm level through trade in intermediate and final goods.  As a result of those trade 
links affiliate jobs are complements rather than substitutes for parent firm jobs.  
 
We estimate a log-linear version of the parent’s labor demand equation (1) using ordinary 
least squares based on our firm survey data of 2200 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 
660 firms in Austria and Germany.  The data are at the firm level and are a cross section for 
the years 1997 – 2000 in Germany and for the years 1999 – 2000 in Austria covering the pro-
duction activity of German and Austrian affiliates in all countries of Eastern Europe including 
the former Soviet Union. Equation 1 includes industry dummies to account for firm heteroge-
neity as well as time dummies for the years 1997 – 2000 in Germany and for the years 1999 – 
2000 in Austria to control for time fixed effects.9 Due to data problems we will not distinguish 
between workers by skill level, because we do not observe wages for skills at the firm level. 
Wages w are average Euro denominated compensations per employee and Y  are sales of par-
ent firms in Austria and Germany and their affiliates in Eastern Europe. The independent 
variable parent employment iL  is number of workers of parent firms in Austria and Germany, 
respectively. 
 
We estimate the model of multinational labor demand separately for affiliates in CEE, SEE 
and the CIS and for the two dominant sectors German machinery and Austrian banking allow-
ing the slope terms β  and γ  to vary across these regions and sectors. 
 
                                                          
9 We are not too worried about the potential problem of endogeneity of the independent variables firm wages and 
firm output, since the time dimension of the data set is limited. The data cover the period 1990 to 2001, but the 
actual figures are for the years 1997 to 2000 for Germany and 1999 to 2000 for Austria. A possible problem of 
endogeneity may arise when wages in Eastern Europe affiliates increase and wages of parent firms decline due to 
firms relocation of production towards Eastern Europe.     
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The results of estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 8. Table 8 gives Austrian and 
German parent companies’ labor demand, respectively for the accession countries CEE, the 
candidate countries of the second round SEE, and the countries of the former Soviet Union 
CIS. The estimated employment demand functions show that a 10 percent decline in affiliate 
wages in CEE countries leads to a 1.6 percent increase rather than decline in the parent com-
pany’s employment demand in both Austria and Germany, respectively.   These estimates 
suggest that the outsourcing activity of German and Austrian firms to the accession countries 
has actually helped to create jobs in Austria and Germany, respectively. Outsourcing some of 
the firm’s activities to their accession countries affiliates has helped Austrian and German 
firms to save between 65 to 80 percent of their labor costs (see Figure 1) helping these firms 
to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. Rather than competing with 
each other as alternative suppliers of the same final goods, affiliates in the accession countries 
complement each other by supplying different components of the same final good.  
 
The picture looks different for the SEE countries. In the SEE countries affiliates’ wages ap-
pear not to play any role for the parent firms’ labor demand in Austria and Germany, respec-
tively. At first, this seems surprising given the relative low wages in these countries. A look at 
Figure 1 offers, however, an answer. German and Austrian affiliates in these countries are not 
able to increase the productivity level as much beyond the country as a whole when producing 
locally. Therefore, outsourcing to the CEE countries does not offer the prospect of lowering 
German and Austrian firms’ overall production costs as much as in the CEE countries. As an 
outsourcing location the SEE countries appear to be less attractive.  
 
The picture looks again different for the CIS countries. Austria’s and Germany’s multination-
als appear to follow a diverse strategy in these markets. German multinationals use the CIS 
countries to lower their overall production costs. A decline in CIS affiliate wages increases 
the German parent’s labor demand. The relationship is significant at the 10 percent level. 
Austrian multinationals, however, appear to substitute cheap labor in the CIS for expensive 
labor in Austria. However, the relationship is not significant at conventional levels. 
 
Finally, I estimate equation (1) for the two dominant sectors German machinery and Austrian 
banking. We include regional and time dummies to control for regional differences and time 
fixed effects. The results are shown in Table 9. Not surprisingly, the pattern of cross wage 
elasticities does differ qualitatively between machinery as the dominant manufacturing sector 
in Germany and banking as the dominant service sector in Austria.  German machinery ap-
pears to be vertically integrated across borders with labor in different countries serving as 
complements rather than substitutes as βj < 0. The relationship is significant at the 10 percent 
level. Austrian banking activities appear to be horizontal with labor in different countries as 
substitutes as βj > 0. However, the estimated cross wage elasticity for the Austrian banking 
sector is not significant at conventional levels. 
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In sum, job losses of Austrian and German investment in Eastern Europe appear low because 
of two reasons. First, in Austria horizontal investment driven by market seeking considera-
tions dominate among investment in Eastern Europe. Second, among vertical investment 
driven by differences in factor prices affiliate jobs in Eastern Europe appear not to compete 
with jobs in Austria and Germany. German and Austrian firms increase their production and 
employment demand in Germany and Austria when workers in their affiliates in the accession 
countries become less costly. Lower costs of Eastern European affiliates help firms to lower 
overall productions costs and to stay competitive. This appears to be the reason why  the job 
losses of Austrian and German investment in Eastern Europe are so strikingly low.10  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Riker and Brainard (1997), Brainard and Riker (1997) get very similar results for US multinational firms’ 
investment strategy in face of  NAFTA; see also Braconnier and Eckholm (2000) for Swedisch multinationals in 
Eastern Europe. 
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6. A Human Capital Crisis? 
 
 
In recent months a new concern has been raised by economic experts in Germany. German 
firms are now outsourcing headquarter activities to Eastern Europe. Germany is now loosing 
the good jobs, the high skilled, R&D and IT jobs, not just the bad, low skilled jobs. Siemens, 
for example, announced in an interview with Financial Times Germany that it plans to out-
source 1/3 of its R&D activity to subsidiaries located in low wage countries like India, China, 
or Russia. It also plans to centralize and outsource some of its headquarter activities like ac-
counting and personnel management to Siemens subsidiaries in the Czech Republic. Siemens 
praised the high quality of skilled workers in Eastern Europe.  Armin Sorg, the Chief Econo-
mist of Siemens argued at a conference on the Economic Consequences of Eastern Enlarge-
ment of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, that Eastern Europe is a particularly attractive location 
for Siemens compared to India and China, because of its proximity to Germany and because 
of the same culture and time zone.11 Similarly, Bank Austria has started to outsource mathe-
matical software development and other headquarter activities to Russia. Are these corporate 
inversions of firm activities taking place at Siemens and Bank Austria only or are they a more 
general trend among multinational firms in Germany and Austria? 12 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 See Financial Times Deutschland , 12. December 2003, and Sorg, Armin, Erwartungen und Erfahrungen eines 
Großunternehmens: Das Beispiel der Siemens AG, Ökonomische Konsequenzen einer EU-Osterweiterung, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Digitale Bibliothek, Bonn 2001. 
12 The trend of corporate inversions has been observed in the US as well where US  firms outsource IT jobs and 
other headquarter activity to India and partly China, see The Economist, January 2004.   
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We can answer this question by looking at the number of skilled jobs German and Austrian 
firms are creating in their affiliates in Eastern Europe. How skill intensive is the activity un-
dertaken by German and Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe compared to their parent activ-
ity in Germany and Austria? Table 10 gives the relevant numbers for Germany. 
 
I use two indicators to measure the skill intensity of German affiliates in Eastern Europe: the 
share of workers with a university or college degree and the share of personnel engaged in 
R&D or engineering activities in the manufacturing and service sector. The data suggest that 
the high skill ratios of affiliates (the number of university or college workers in percent of 
total affiliate workers) are 2 to 3 times as large as that of German parent firms in all three re-
gions CEE, SEE, and CIS. The share of university or college graduates among affiliate work-
ers in Eastern Europe varies between 86 percent (Czech Republic) and 8 percent (Slovenia). 
The most skill intensive activity is undertaken by affiliates in the Czech Republic (skill share 
of 86 percent), in Russia (skill share of 63 percent), in Croatia and Slovakia (skill share of 40 
percent). This compares with an average share of university or college graduates of German 
parent firms of 18 percent only. Thus, measured by the number of university and college 
graduates, German affiliates in Bulgaria are 12 times as skill intensive than their German par-
ent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic 5.5 times as skill intensive, affiliates in Russia 2.9 
times as skill intensive. Only affiliates in Hungary have a skill share below that of German 
parent firms.  
 
A similar picture emerges when the skill intensity of German affiliates is measured by the 
share of workers engaged in R&D and engineering (right panel of Table 10). The R&D per-
sonnel ratios of affiliates in Eastern Europe range between 4.0 percent (Slovakia) and 27.8 
percent (Croatia and Russia). This compares with an average R&D personnel share of 13.6 
percent of German parent firms. Thus, German affiliates in Russia are 2.9 times as R&D in-
tensive as their German parent firms, affiliates in the Czech Republic and Croatia 1.7 times as 
R&D intensive, and affiliates in Ukraine 1.4 as research intensive. The remaining countries 
affiliates’ R&D intensity is below that of German parent firms.  
 
In Table 11 I look at Austria’s export of high skill jobs to Eastern Europe. It appears from the 
Table that the share of university and college graduate workers in percent of Austrian affili-
ates’ workers in Eastern Europe range between 9.6 percent (Romania) and 34.8 percent (Rus-
sia) compared to a skill share of  14.7 percent of Austrian parent firms. Thus, only affiliates in 
Slovenia have a smaller employment share of university and college graduates compared to 
Austrian parent firms. Affiliates in Bulgaria employ 26 times as many university graduates 
compared to the Austrian parent company, affiliates in Ukraine 19 times, affiliates in Russia 
and Romania 3.7 times as many university graduates compared to Austrian parent firms. Al-
though the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates are extremely high and much larger than that of 
German affiliates in Eastern Europe (they range between 3.8 percent in affiliates in the Baltic 
States to 45.8 percent in affiliates in Russia given in the right panel of Table 11), none of the 
Austrian affiliates’ research and engineering activities in Eastern Europe exceed that of their 
Austrian parent firms with the exception of those in Russia. The reason for this is the ex-
tremely high R&D intensity of parent firms in Austria. The high R&D intensity of parent 
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firms in Austria appear large indeed since they exceed that of German parent firms. This is 
quite striking. 
 
One possible reason for this result is economic policy. The Austrian government gives strong 
tax incentives and subsidies to R&D activity which might have made firms to move more into 
this activity in Austria and to locate less of this activity in Eastern Europe. 13 One indication 
that the large R&D ratios of parent firms in Austria are induced by policy is the diverse pat-
tern between the skill personnel ratios and the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates in Eastern 
Europe. Typically, when the government subsidizes R&D, the R&D sector expands and com-
petes with other sectors for skilled workers.  However, when firms have the option to out-
source some of the activities to Eastern Europe which use skilled workers but which do not 
qualify for a domestic R&D subsidy (such as high tech activity in other sectors), they can 
avoid competing for talent in the local labor market. 14 
 
Take the example of Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria as outsourcing locations. Austrian affili-
ates in Bulgaria and Ukraine employ 26 to 19 times as many skilled workers in production 
than their parent firms in Austria, but only 0.27 and 0.14 times as many skilled workers in 
research and engineering. Similarly, but less striking in Russia. Austrian affiliates in Russia 
use 3.7 times as many skilled workers in production and the same amount of skilled workers 
in R&D activity as Austrian parent firms. German affiliates in Russia use about the same skill 
intensity in production as well as research (see Tables 8 and 9). In sum, affiliate activities of 
Austrian multinationals in Eastern Europe appear to be more skill intensive in terms of their 
share of university and college workers but less skill intensive in terms of their R&D inten-
sity, although the R&D ratios of Austrian affiliates in some of the Eastern European countries 
turn out to be extremely large. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Moreover, Austria has one of highest share of state financed R&D, see Marin (1995).  
14 For Austria’s R&D and technology policy and its effects see Marin (1995). For a model in which multinational 
investment is motivated to avoid a ‘war for talent‘ in the home labor market, see Marin and Verdier (2003, 
2004), see the appendix for the effects of a R&D subsidy. 
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These are striking and puzzling numbers. German and Austrian multinationals tend to out-
source the most skill and R&D intensive activities to Eastern Europe. Why is this happening? 
Economic theory guides us to look at the factor endowment of these countries for an answer. 
If countries outsource the most skill intensive activities to other countries, then these countries 
must be poorly endowed with skills relative to their trading partners.15   Table 12 documents 
Germany’s and Austria’s endowment with skills compared to Eastern Europe. It appears from 
the table that the Baltic States, Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria are the most skill rich countries 
as measured by the share of the labor force with a tertiary education level. Germany’s educa-
tion level lies below the OECD average and roughly matches that of the accession countries 
average. In particular, Germany is less skill rich than the Baltic States, Russia, and Hungary. 
In this ranking of countries Austria turns out to be the most skill poor country. 16   
                                                          
15 For a theory of multinational investment based on factor endowment differences between countries, see Help-
man (1984). 
16 These numbers do not say much about the quality of education in these countries. The numbers are quantita-
tive measures of formal education only.   
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What has happened to the two countries, Austria and Germany, world famous as the ‘nations 
of poets and thinkers’ that both rank so low among the rich OECD countries? To understand 
why Germany and Austria fare so poorly in an international comparison of skill endowment 
levels, we have to turn to history on the one hand and to the accumulation of skills in the post 
war period on the other. 
 
I have estimated in Marin (1995) that World War II and the mass killing of jews in the holo-
caust has destroyed 30 percent of Austria’s human capital stock. A less conservative estimate 
by Stadler (1987) which includes the jewish population which were not members of jewish 
communities as well as the skilled non jewish population which went into exile range the loss 
of Austria’s human capital stock at 67 percent. Most efforts in Austria in the post war period 
went into rebuilding the physical capital stock destroyed by World War II. But Austria never 
recovered from the destruction of its human capital stock, as the accumulation of skills in the 
post war period has not been able to make up for it. 17 
 
In Tables 13 and Table 14 I look at the accumulation of skills in the post war period in the 
two countries. Table 13 reports the annual growth rates of the human capital stock per person 
in the two countries for the period 1960 to 1997. This measure of human capital is obtained 
by aggregating five education levels using the market wage of each education level as a 
weight. The market wage of each education level, in turn, is estimated by a Mincer type wage 
equation which relates years of schooling to the hourly wage rate. 18  The table shows that 
human capital accumulation has dramatically slowed in the 1990s in both countries. In Ger-
many, compared to the 1980s the annual growth rate of the human capital stock per person 
declined from 0.75 percent to 0.18 percent in the 1990s. This is a slow down in the growth 
rate by more than 2/3. In Austria, the annual growth rate of the skill stock more than halved 
between the 1980s and 1990s from 0.37 percent to 0.15 percent. Unfortunately, the human 
capital stock data stop in the year 1997.  To see what happened after 1997 we turn to Table 
14. The table documents that in Germany the share of the labor force with a tertiary education 
level increased modestly from 11 percent in 1994 to 14 percent in 2000, while this share re-
mained somewhat unchanged in Austria. Thus, in the 1990s when trade integration with the 
former communist countries and the revolution of information technology both have put pres-
sure on the demand for skilled labor, the supply of skilled labor has almost come to a hold in 
both countries. This has generated a dramatic scarcity of human capital in both countries. 
                                                          
17 I am not aware of a similar estimate for Germany.  
18 For details on the estimation procedure see Koman and Marin (2000). 
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7. Are ‘Maquiladoras’ Emerging in Germany and Austria? 
 
 
These numbers suggest that the source of the problem is the relative scarcity of human capital 
in Germany and Austria. German and Austrian firms move the most skill intensive activities 
to Eastern Europe, because they cannot find the skilled workers in their home labor market. 
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The skill move to Eastern Europe may explain why the wage gap between skilled and un-
skilled workers has remained constant over the 1990s in Germany in spite of the information 
revolution and trade integration with Eastern Europe. 
 
Figure 2 gives the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the 1990s in Germany and Austria on 
the one hand and in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic on the other. We use as a proxy 
for the skill wage ratio relative wages of non-production to production workers. The data 
show a strong increase in the relative wage for skills in Poland and the other accession coun-
tries during the 1990s, while this ratio remained constant in Germany and declined somewhat 
in Austria. These data do not show a pattern of factor prices that trade economists usually 
expect from trade and investment integration. Take the example of Germany and Poland. 
Typically, when a skill rich country like Germany (relative to Poland)  integrates with a skill 
poor country like Poland (see Table 12), we expect relative wages for skills to go up in Ger-
many and to decline in Poland. The reason is that trade integration leads a country to special-
ize in those sectors which use the country’s abundant factor intensively. Thus, skill rich Ger-
many specializes in the skill intensive sectors and labor rich Poland specializes in labor inten-
sive sectors. As a result the relative demand for skills goes up in Germany and declines in 
Poland leading to an increase in the relative wage for skills in Germany and to a decline of 
those in Poland.   By the same argument in skill poor Austria relative wages for skills are ex-
pected to decline with trade integration with Eastern Europe. 
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Why have relative wages for skilled workers increased in Eastern Europe and remained con-
stant in Austria and Germany? Why do we observe a perverse Stolper-Samuelson effect in 
these countries? Economic experts have explained the constancy of the wag gap in Germany 
and Austria in the 1990s by labor market rigidities. Labor market rigidities may explain why 
low skilled wages have not declined. But the puzzle remains. Why have skilled wages not 
increased in Germany and why have they not declined in Austria with trade integration with 
Eastern Europe?19 Lets first focus on Germany. Two easy answers for the constancy of the 
wage gap in Germany may be obtained from Tables 1, 2 and 12. First, Table 1 and 2 show hat 
the trade and investment shares with Eastern Europe are too small to have an impact on wage 
inequality in Germany. 20  But if this is the answer, why then have trade and investment inte-
gration with Eastern Europe not influenced wage inequality in Austria, where these shares are 
much larger? Second, Table 12 shows that Germany’s endowment with skills more or less 
matches the accession countries’ average. Thus, relative factor prices may not have changed 
in Germany, because Germany’s trade integration with the accession countries is an integra-
tion among countries with similar factor endowments. But if this is the right answer, why then 
have relative wages for skills in the accession countries not remained more or less the same as 
well? 21 Something else must be at work here.  
 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) have argued in the context of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) that this perverse Stolper-Samuelson effect can be explained by capital 
movements in the form of foreign direct investment from the US to Mexico. US multination-
als started to outsource the more labor intensive stages of production to Mexico. The so called 
Maquiladoras emerged in Mexico. Maquiladoras are affiliates of US multinationals in Mexico 
which specialize in the low skill intensive part of the value chain. In their model a single 
manufactured good is produced from a continuum of intermediate inputs, which are in turn 
produced using skilled workers, unskilled workers, and capital. Assuming that trade does not 
lead to factor price equalization, the equilibrium is described by the labor rich South (Mexico) 
producing and exporting a range of inputs up to some critical ratio of skilled to unskilled la-
bor, with the skill rich North (US) producing the remainder of the inputs. The northern inputs 
include such activities as R&D and marketing, which use little or no unskilled labor, while the 
activities that are more intensive in unskilled labor are outsourced to the South. In this model 
US multinationals’ outsourcing activities to Mexico leads relative wages for skills to increase 
in the US as well as in Mexico. The reason is that the outsourced activity from the US to 
Mexico is less skilled labor intensive than what the US is now producing, but more skilled-
labor intensive than what Mexico used to produce. As a result relative demand for skilled la-
bor increases in both countries.  
 
The data I have just presented, however, suggest that with Eastern Enlargement an inverse 
Maquiladoras effect is in the process of emerging in Germany and Austria. German and Aus-
trian multinationals outsource the more skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe 
                                                          
19 Fersterer and Winter-Ebner (2003) actually find a slight decline in the return rates on education in Austria.  
20 see Krugman (1994) who argues that the trade shares with low wage countries in the US are much too small to 
explain the increase in wage inequality in the US. 
21 One could argue that the accession countries’ transformation from a planned to a market economy has actually 
contributed to the increase in the wag gap in these countries. Lorentowicz (2004) finds weak support for this for 
Poland.  
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(see columns 2 of Tables 10 and 1122) and specialize in the more labor intensive stages of 
production in Germany and Austria, respectively. Thus, firms located in Germany and Austria 
are in the process of becoming the Maquiladoras of German and Austrian affiliates in Eastern 
Europe with a reversal of roles between headquarter and affiliate activities. The activities 
transferred by German and Austrian multinationals to Eastern Europe are more skill intensive 
than those now produced in Germany and Austria, respectively. As a result, the relative de-
mand for skilled labor declines in Germany and Austria. This way, firms’ outsourcing of high 
skill intensive activities to Eastern Europe has helped to ease the human capital crisis in Ger-
many and Austria.23  This may explain why relative wages for skills in Germany have not 
increased with the revolution of information technology in the 1990s as firms’ outsourcing 
activities have removed some of the demand pressure on skills from the German labor market. 
Whether relative wages for skills increase or decline in Eastern Europe  depends on whether 
or not the outsourcing activities transferred to Eastern Europe are more or less skill intensive 
than the activities formerly produced in Eastern Europe. The increase in relative wages for 
skills in Eastern Europe suggest that the activities transferred from Germany and Austria, re-
spectively are more skill intensive than those formerly produced in Eastern Europe. 24  
 
Is the outsourcing of skill intensive activities to Eastern Europe by German firms economi-
cally important? I compute the additional demand for workers with a university or college 
degree in the local German labor market, that would have arisen when German firms would 
not have moved the high skill activities to Eastern Europe. We then relate the demand for uni-
versity and college graduates due to firms’ outsourcing to Germany’s additional supply of 
university and college graduates of the 1990s to get a sense of how firms’ outsourcing has 
helped to ease the scarcity of human capital in the 1990s. This is done in Table 15 which 
quantifies the extent to which firms’ outsourcing activity to Eastern Europe has helped to ease 
the demand pressure on skills in the German labor market in the 1990s. 
 
German firms have created the largest absolute number of university or college degree jobs in 
the Czech and Slovak Republic, followed by Poland, Hungary and Russia. From the firm sur-
vey I estimate that German firms have created a demand of 106.197 skilled workers in East-
ern Europe in the 1990s (see column 1 of Table 15). Relating this number to the total number 
                                                          
22 Austrian multinationals in particular to skill rich Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Poland; German multinationals in particular to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Russia, and the Slovak Republic. 
23 For a model in which multinational investment is motivated to avoid a ‚war for talent‘ in the home labor mar-
ket, see Marin and Verdier (2003, 2004). 
24 In the Feenstra and Hanson (1996) model it is assumed that the US is the skill rich country and Mexico the 
labor rich country with US firms outsourcing  of the labor intensive stages of production to Mexico leading  to 
an increase in relative wages for skills in both countries.  Applying this model to Germany and Eastern Europe 
with Germany as the skill poor country and Eastern Europe as the skill rich country  leads to the prediction that 
German outsourcing to EE leads to a decline in relative wages for skills in both countries. To reconcile the 
model with the fact that relative wages for skills increased in Eastern Europe one has to assume exogenous dif-
ferences in technology between the two countries and/or that the activity transferred is more skill intensive than 
the rest of the recipient economy, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for the stability conditions and relative wages. 
This paper does not attempt to explain the evolution of the wag gap in Eastern Europe. To do so requires a more 
careful analyses of each particular accession country.  For example, Poland’s stark increase in the relative wage 
for skills appears to be induced by outsourcing investments from skill rich countries like France, the US and the 
Netherlands rather than Germany. For empirical evidence on a Maquiladoras effect in Poland, see Lorentowicz 
(2004). 
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of university and college graduates produced in Germany between 1990 and 1997, the de-
mand for skills in Eastern Europe accounts for 12.2 percent of the total supply of university 
and college graduates produced in the 1990s in Germany (column 2). Assuming that univer-
sity graduates in the accession countries have 80 percent of the productivity of German uni-
versity graduates (see Figure 1 which shows that all workers in the accession countries reach 
60 percent of the German productivity level), the 12.2 percent translates into a demand for 
skills in Germany of about 10 percent of the skill supply in Germany. Thus, a skill demand of  
10 percent of Germany’s additional skill supply of the 1990s has not become effective in 
Germany due to firms’ outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe. At first, this may appear to be 
a small number. But it is not when Germany’s small trade and investment shares with Eastern 
Europe are taken into account. The number tells us that an investment share with Eastern 
Europe of around 4 to 5 percent during the 1990s has created a skill demand of 10 percent of 
Germany’s new produced skill supply of the 1990s.  
 
I now turn to Austria. Given the above explanation for Germany, the constant wage gap in 
Austria still remains a puzzle.  In skill poor Austria both trade as well as the outsourcing ac-
tivities of firms to skill rich Eastern Europe should have led to a decline in relative wages for 
skills in Austria. Skill poor Austria specializes in the labor and raw material intensive sectors 
leading to a relative decline in the demand for skills in Austria. What then explains that rela-
tive wages remained more or less unchanged during the 1990s?  In order to get to an answer I 
first quantify the skill exodus to Eastern Europe in terms of Austria’s additional skill supply 
of the 1990s. This is done in the left panel of Table 15.     
 
It appears from the table that in Austria the ease on skills due to firms outsourcing of skill 
intensive activities is much more dramatic compared to Germany. This is not surprising, since 
Austria is more skill poor compared to Germany (see Table 12) and is much more integrated 
with Eastern Europe (see Tables 1 and 2). Austria’s multinationals are creating a total of 
42.233 university graduate jobs in Eastern Europe. The most important destinations of these 
jobs are Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic. Skill rich Hungary alone is absorbing 
23 percent of the total supply of university graduates in Austria in the period 1990 to 1997 
(column 2). Assuming a productivity differential between Austrian and Hungarian skilled 
workers of 20 percent, the outsourcing activity to Hungary alone is reducing the demand for 
skills in Austria by 18.4 percent relative to the additional supply of skills in the 1990s. An 
analogous calculation suggests that the demand for skills in Eastern Europe induced by firms’ 
outsourcing activities accounts for 0.8*59.7 = 48 percent of the additional skill supply in Aus-
tria produced in the 1990s. This number suggests that without firms’ outsourcing, Austria 
would have had a 48 percent larger demand for skills in terms of its additional skill supply of 
the 1990s. According to this computation, relative wages for skills in Austria should have 
declined dramatically. But they have not. Why?  
 
Here is a possible answer. Government policy may have been contributing to the constancy of 
the wage gap in Austria. I have argued elsewhere (Marin 1995) that the Austrian government 
has pursued an active technology policy targeting to increase the share of R&D as a percent of 
GDP to the level of other OECD countries. Austria provides generous tax incentives and sub-
sidies to R&D. Among OECD countries Austria has the largest share of state financed R&D 
matching those of the US and France with a large research intensive military sector. Given the 
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scarcity of human capital in Austria, this R&D policy has led wages for skills to go up to ab-
sorb the additional demand for skilled workers induced by the R&D subsidy (for the working 
of a R&D subsidy see the appendix). In sum, relative wages for skills may have not declined 
in skill poor Austria in spite of trade and investment integration with skill rich Eastern Europe 
because of the technology policy pursued by the government.25  
 
In order to take a first look at whether an inverse Maquiladoras effect is indeed at work in 
Austria we examine now whether annual changes in nonproduction workers’ share in the 
wage bill in Austria is negatively correlated with the share of intra-firm imports from Eastern 
Europe by Austrian multinationals. We use the nonproduction workers’share in the wage bill 
as a proxy for the share of skilled workers in the wage bill.  I focus on Austria rather than 
Germany, since Austria has had hardly any outgoing foreign investment before 1989. In 2001 
employment by Austrian affiliates in Eastern Europe accounts for 6 percent of Austria’s total 
employment. As a result, intra-firm imports from Eastern Europe by Austrian multinationals 
in percent of GDP increased rapidly from zero to 3.3 percent of GDP (see Figure A1 in the 
appendix). Moreover, according to Table 12, Austria is clearly less rich in skills compared to 
Eastern Europe. Thus, if there is an inverse Maquiladoras effect at work, we should observe it 
in Austria. 
 
I regress the annual change in the share of nonproduction workers on a constant and on 
changes in real GDP, on changes in the investment share I/GDP, on changes in the share of 
R&D expenditures in percent of GDP, and on changes in the share of intra-firm imports from 
EE by Austrian multinationals in percent of GDP. The regression is run for the period 1966 to 
2001. The data are from Statistik Austria except for intra-firm imports from Eastern Europe 
by Austrian multinationals which is estimated from the firm survey data (see Figure A1 of the 
appendix). The coefficient of -0.006 on the share of intrafirm imports from EE is highly sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. Multiplying this coefficient by the annual growth rate of 0.125 
percent for the share of intrafirm imports from Eastern Europe, we explain about 12 percent 
of the annual change of 0.006 in the share of nonproduction workers over the period 1966-
2001 (-0.006 x 0.125/0.006).  The coefficient of 0.013 on the R&D/GDP ratio is not signifi-
cant, so we do not use it to estimate the contribution of technical change on relative wage 
shares. In any case, these estimates have to be seen as a first look at the data, since with 35 
observations there is not enough variation in the data.26 But still, according to this regression 
the rising intra-firm import share from Eastern Europe explains 12 percent of the shift away 
from non-production labor in Austria suggesting that multinationals‘ outsourcing of skill in-
tensive activities to Eastern Europe has contributed to the declining prospects of skilled rela-
tive to unskilled workers in Austria. 27 28 
                                                          
25 However, both factors will not explain all of the constancy of the wag gap in Austria given the size of the skill 
exodus to Eastern Europe. In addition, downward rigidities of skilled wages must be at work as well. Indeed, 
Austria is witnessing the highest increase in its unemployment rate among university graduates since world war 
II (see Figure A1 in the appendix). 
26 Unfortunately, at this stage we are not able to estimate the Maquiladoras effect with our firm level data, since 
we do not observe  wages by skills at the firm level.   
27 Feenstra and Hanson (1996) run a similar regression and show that the share of nonproduction workers in the 
United States is positively and significantly correlated with increasing imports. The rising import share over the 
period 1979-87 explains 15 to 33 percent of the increase in the nonproduction workers‘ share.  Their estimate is 
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based on 436 observations of four digit SIC industries.  They use the total import share including imports of 
inputs and final goods from independent firms rather than intra-firm imports by multinationals only as we do. 
28 It has been argued  that the recent decline of public sector employment due to cost cutting in the public sector 
has been decisive for the recent sharp increase in unemployment rates among academic people in Austria (see 
Figure A1 in the appendix). However, we do not find a statistically significant impact of this variable on the 
wage share of nonproduction workers in Austria.  
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8. What Can Be Done? 
 
 
Can an R&D Subsidy Prevent the Exodus of Skilled Jobs? 
 
The governments in Germany and Austria might be tempted to address the problem of firms’ 
outsourcing of headquarter activity by subsidizing skill intensive activities in Germany and 
Austria. On December 19, 2003 Chancellor Schroeder declared in the public media that his 
government will meet the challenge of the loss of high skill jobs to offshore production to low 
wage countries by creating high skill jobs in Germany. The German labor unions IG Metall 
ask to make subsidies and public procurement projects contingent on local production Do 
these policies make sense? Are they desirable for the economy as whole? 29 
 
A subsidy on high skill intensive activity may as well make things worse when a country is 
faced with a human capital scarcity. By increasing the profitability of R&D activity, firms 
will increase their demand for high skilled labor exacerbating the scarcity of human capital.  
When the human capital constraint binds, the subsidy will result in a relative increase in 
skilled wages leading to a decline in manufacturing activity. The reason is that the subsidy 
induces the R&D sector to compete with the manufacturing sector for scarce skilled workers 
pushing up the wages for skills. The expansion of the R&D sector then crowds out the activity 
of the manufacturing sector. As a result the manufacturing sector contracts and the country 
ends up with higher relative wages for skilled workers than before the R&D subsidy was in-
troduced. This unexpected result of a R&D subsidy is generated by the economy wide scarcity 
of human capital.30 
 
 
Liberalize the Movement of Skilled Workers with Eastern Enlargement 
 
If an R&D subsidy cannot help what actually can help?  If the governments in Germany and 
Austria care about where these skill intensive headquarter activities take place (and it might 
make sense to care about it)  it needs to find a way to relax the constraint on  human capital in 
the economy. There are two non exclusive ways to do this: to let skills come in from other 
countries, immigration and/or to produce more skills, education policy. As I have shown in 
the paper, human capital accumulation has dramatically slowed in the 1990s, in particular in 
Germany. Therefore, it is important to create an environment in which people find it attractive 
to invest in human capital. This requires to let relative returns to education to increase by in-
                                                          
29 See, Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 3, 2003.  To get a sense of the crisis felt in Germany consider the new 
proposal discussed in the social democratic party of  government Schroeder. On January 5, 2004 Schroeder de-
clared that he wants to meet the challenges ahead by creating 10 ivy league universities like Harvard and Stan-
ford in Germany. This sounds like revolution for a party with an egalitarian tradition typically opposed to any 
elitist ideas in particular in education. But the party still opposes tuition fees for students when Tony Blair’s 
labor government is introducing just that in British universities.  
30 For this counterintuitive effect of a R&D subsidy see Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the appendix. This 
effect of a R&D subsidy will be particularly prevalent in small countries with a small number of skilled workers. 
An example is Austria. The Austrian government pursued an active R&D policy in the late 1980s and early 
1990s with the described unintended results, see Marin (1995). 
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troducing more flexible labor markets in which relative wages for skills can adjust to changes 
in market conditions. The PISA study documented that Germany has a problem not only in 
the quantity of educated people it produces, but also in the quality of education.  Education 
policy is now one of the central policy issues of the German government and rightly so. Fo-
cussing on the quantity of human capital produced, Koman and Marin (2000) show that the 
decline in the growth rate of human capital in the 1990s has come with the costs of  0.5 and 
0.3 percentages points less growth annually in Germany and Austria, respectively. These es-
timates calculate the direct growth effects of human capital but do not take into account po-
tential spillovers to the rest of the economy. If the scarcity of human capital leads corpora-
tions to outsource headquarter and R&D activities to other countries and these activities gen-
erate spillovers to the rest of the economy, then the scarcity of human capital may come with 
growth losses of  much larger size than  those obtained from a direct growth accounting calcu-
lation31 32 It is important to note, however, that firms’ outsourcing to Eastern Europe leads - 
like any form of economic integration – to an increase in welfare in both Austria and Ger-
many on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. 33  
 
But education policy will take time to change the skill endowment of a country. Immigration 
is definitely the faster way to deal with a human capital crisis. In Germany the Green Card for 
IT jobs is the first attempt to bring skills into the country. The German government is now 
discussing a new immigration law which will govern immigration under European Enlarge-
ment. Liberalizing the movement of high skilled labor with Eastern Enlargement would be 
desirable under this circumstances. The import of skilled workers from Eastern Europe would 
lower relative wages for skilled workers (assuming labor markets are allowed to adjust) and 
with it the cost of innovation in Germany. This will make it attractive for firms to undertake 
these knowledge intensive activities in Germany rather than Eastern Europe. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Indirect evidence that the outsourcing activities of German multinationals are producing such spillovers to the 
rest of the economy is Protsenko (2003). He estimates with the same firm survey data whether vertical and hori-
zontal FDI differ with respect to their spillover effects in the Czech Republic. He finds that German vertical FDI 
in the Czech Republic has positive effects on the productivity of local firms, while horizontal FDI does not have 
such effects. This stands in contrast with previous studies on FDI in the Czech Republic which typically find 
negative productivity effects of total FDI, not distinguishing between vertical and horizontal FDI. These positive 
spillovers from vertical FDI on a host country casts doubts on the previously held notion that offshore production 
is a ‘bad’ thing for an country receiving FDI. What appears to matter here is what kind of firm activity is out-
sourced to the host country.  
32 Coe and Helpman (1995) estimate international R&D spillovers and they find that it does matter economically 
where the R&D activity takes place. 
33  For the difference between welfare and growth in a global economy, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), for 
the welfare effects of outsourcing, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996). 
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Appendix A: Data 
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Appendix B: A Subsidy to R&D 
 
 
In this section I want to show how an R&D subsidy works when a country is faced with a 
human capital constraint. I use the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model of endogenous 
growth to illustrate this. 
 
Consider an economy with two sectors manufacturing X and R&D. Each of these sectors uses 
human capital as the factor of production. The R&D sector is developing intermediate goods 
which are used as inputs in manufacturing. Firms in the manufacturing sector engage in mo-
nopolistic competition and produce differentiated goods. Firms are valued according to their 
expected profit stream. It is assumed that these firms posses indefinitely monopoly power in 
the particular brand they produce. Firms decide whether to introduce a new brand product by 
comparing the anticipated stream of profits with expected cost of innovation. These costs de-
pend primarily on the reward of the factor used in R&D human capital. The profitability of 
producing these intermediate goods determines the rate at which new products are introduced. 
The more intermediate goods the R&D sector produces the higher is the total factor produc-
tivity in the manufacturing sector. Hence, a country’s growth rate is determined by the speed 
by which the R&D sector introduces new brands.  
 
The steady state conditions of the economy are illustrated in Figure A2. The horizontal line 
gives the innovation rate of the economy g, while the vertical line gives the size of the manu-
facturing sector X. The line HH represents the human capital constraint of the economy, while 
the line NN is the Schumpeter line which captures the notion that innovation is driven by the 
search for profits. Profits from innovation have to be at least as large as the cost of capital (the 
interest rate) to maintain the incentive for innovation. HH slopes downwards because an in-
crease in the rate of innovation requires more human capital in research and therefore less 
human capital is available for manufacturing. NN slopes upwards, because an increase in the 
rate of innovation raises real interest rates. Therefore, firms require a higher profit rate in or-
der to engage in R&D. To attain a higher profit rate, the manufacturing sector X has to in-
crease and more human capital has to be employed in manufacturing.  Point A describes the 
long run equilibrium. 
 
The figure describes how the growth rate of the economy is constraint by the availability of 
human capital on the one hand and by market incentives for innovation on the other. For ex-
ample, a country will innovate less fast when it has a smaller amount of human capital (a con-
traction of H shifts in the HH line) and when its firms have a smaller degree of monopoly 
power  (a reduction in monopoly power shift down the NN line). 
 
Now consider a subsidy to R&D. This policy has no effect on the human capital constraint 
HH. It reduces, however, the cost of innovation and as a result it increases the profit rate for a 
given volume of manufacturing. Therefore the volume of manufacturing has to decline to 
bring the profit rate back to its equilibrium (profits have to equal the cost of capital). In Figure 
A2, an R&D subsidy shifts down NN to the broken line with the new equilibrium point B. As 
a result the R&D subsidy raises the rate of innovation. But at the same time it leads to a con-
traction of the manufacturing sector. The reason is that by raising the profitability of R&D, 
 48
the R&D sector expands and competes with the manufacturing sector for the scarce factor 
human capital. As the human capital constraint binds, wages for human capital go up and the 
manufacturing sector shrinks to restore equilibrium in the market for skills. The contraction of 
manufacturing represents the cost of faster innovation. 
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